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On December 9, 2013, Exit 6 Brewery, a small establishment located 
forty miles outside of St. Louis, received a letter from Starbucks demanding 
that the brewery stop serving a beer called the “Frappicino” at their 
venue.1 Starbucks asserted that Exit 6 Brewery was infringing upon 
Starbucks’ trademarked “Frappuccino” coffee drink, and that the “Frappicino” 
brew might be confused2 for an officially licensed Starbucks product.3 In 
response to the cease-and-desist letter, Jeff Britton, the owner of Exit 6 
Brewery, ceased use of the “Frappicino” brew and sent Starbucks a check 
for six dollars, claiming it was the net profit from the three “Frappicino” 
beers sold.4 Along with the check, Britton sent a letter joking about the 
Frappuccino coffee by referring to it as the “F word” and noting, “We just 
want to help Starbucks. Us small businesses need to stick together.”5 
Instantly, the facetious letter went viral in a seeming attempt to shame 
Starbucks.6 
 
 1.  Belle Cushing, Starbucks Sends Cease and Desist to Brewpub Serving ‘Frappicino’ 
Beer, Owner Responds, GRUB STREET (Dec. 30, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://www.grubstreet. 
com/2013/12/exit-6-missouri-starbucks.html. 
 2.  Federal and state trademark law uses a likelihood of confusion test because 
owners can hold the same trademark in different products as long as there is no confusion, 
i.e. Bentley cars and Bentley lumber. Many different circuits have developed their own 
formulations of what determines a likelihood of confusion, but one of the first formulations 
was developed in the Polaroid Corp. v. Polorad Electronics Corp. case. Polaroid Corp. v. 
Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2nd Cir. 1961) (A likelihood of confusion’s 
success is based on the following factors: (1) the strength of his mark, (2) the degree of 
similarity between the two marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that 
the prior owner will bridge the gap, (5) actual confusion, (6) the reciprocal of defendant’s 
good faith in adopting its own mark, (7) the quality of defendant’s product, and (8) the 
sophistication of the buyers); see also AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-
49 (9th Cir. 1979) (To determine confusion between related goods, the following factors 
are relevant: (1) strength of the mark, (2) proximity of the goods, (3) similarity of the 
marks, (4) evidence of actual confusion, (5) marketing channels, (6) type of goods and the 
degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchase, (7) defendant’s intent in selecting 
the mark, and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines). 
 3.  Cushing, supra note 1. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See id; see also Graham Averill, Starbucks Threatens Nano-Brewery With 
Lawsuit; Brewer Gets Funny, PASTE, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.pastemagazine.com/ 
articles/2013/12/starbucks-threatens-nano-brewery-with-lawsuit-brew.html; Ian Froeb, 
Local Brewers’ response to Starbucks cease-and-desist goes viral, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Dec. 31, 2013, http://www.stltoday.com/entertainment/dining/bars-and-clubs-
other/hip-hops/local-brewer-s-response-to-starbucks-cease-and-desist-goes/article_5a4d65e 
e-cdb4-51a6-9d2c-718adf74beaa.html. 
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Shaming is just one of the modern defense tactics companies use instead 
of pursuing trademark litigation.7 Most companies use this strategy to 
inform the public of a bullying company.8 If the company continues such 
behavior, it may lose consumer loyalty or disassociation with the brand 
and, in turn, lose goodwill.9 
It is common for trademark holders to threaten legal action against 
many individuals, even if they do not have a strong claim of infringement. 
This is considered “overactive policing” of their trademark.10  There is the 
potential for this overactive policing to result in an abuse of trademark 
protection, either by extending a company’s trademark protection or bullying 
those that have a valid claim in a trademark, which will be discussed 
further within the comment.11 Markholders12 that do this are usually 
attempting to intimidate smaller holders of trademarks,13 or individuals 
using descriptive terms similar or identical to their trademark, into ceasing 
use of their trademarks.14 The markholder will typically attempt to claim 
broader rights in their trademark or use overactive policing efforts to 
 
 7.  See generally Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. 
REV. 625 (2011) (discussing the effectiveness and availability of shaming to small 
businesses and individuals). 
 8.  Id. at 665–66. 
 9.  Id. at 672–74. 
 10.  Overactive policing is not uncommon because it is an easy method for an 
individual to protect their trademarks, however, it is arguably a necessary task to protect a 
trademark considering the uncertain protections of the current trademark regime. In fact, 
the uncertainty in trademark rights allows dilution actions to be brought by individuals 
who are not in the same market or dealing with the same products/services as an alleged 
infringer because these actions do not require competition or evidence of confusion or 
passing off, making the rights of a famous mark unreasonably broad. Id. at 640-45. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  The term “markholders” will be used synonymously with “trademark bully,” 
“trademark owner,” and “markholder.” “Markholders” is a term of art designated to refer 
to the owner of a trademark. See generally Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social 
Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 
851 (2010). 
 13.  Targets of markholders will hereinafter be referred to as “accused infringer,” 
“target of a trademark holder,” or “targeted party.”  These terms refer to the party or 
individuals who are being “bullied” or harassed by companies through the sending of 
cease-and-desist letters and unethical, yet legal, groundless litigation tactics to persuade 
the “target” from continuing use of their trademark. 
 14.  Grinvald, supra note 7, at 642. 
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maintain protection of their already overly broad trademark rights, 
whether an alleged infringer ceases use of the mark or not.15 
The goal of shaming as an alternative to trademark litigation, like that 
seen with Mr. Britton, is to curb this “bullying” behavior from markholders.16 
While this may be an occasionally effective, informal way to deal with 
overly aggressive markholders, a formal codified solution would be more 
effective to deter markholders from acting aggressively in order to 
preserve the value of trademarks. When markholders are bullying, the 
value of the trademark may be reduced when the public gains a negative 
association with their brand.17 When alleged infringers are bullied, the 
value to consumers is reduced because the alleged infringers are bullied 
out of markets before they are able to firmly secure a foothold. 
While some trademark holders choose to act aggressively on their own 
accord, other trademark holders are forced to act to protect their trademarks 
from being used by other parties.18 One such example occurred in Los 
Feliz, Los Angeles, after a comedian opened a coffee shop named “Dumb 
Starbucks.”19 Everything in the store replicated Starbucks products, 
except that the word “dumb” preceded every menu item, and the comedian 
included conspicuous disclosures of disassociation with the large coffee 
chain throughout the store.20  Instances of association with a trademark 
are not usually as blatant as this, but they are arguably protectable under 
freedom of speech or parody.21 However, if third parties frequently use 
 
 15.  Id. at 645–51; see, e.g., Kirk Carapezza, Chicken Vs. Kale: Artist Fights Chick-
Fil-A Suit, NPR, Dec. 6, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/12/06/143195033/chicken-vs-kale-
vt-artist-fights-chick-fil-a-suit; Pete Mason, The Difference Between ‘Eat More Kale’ and 
‘Eat Mor Chikin,’ HUFFINGTON POST, May 3, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost. com/pete-
mason/eat-more-kale_b_1469661.html. In this circumstance, Chick-fil-A was attempting 
to maintain an overly broad interest in their trademark “Eat More Chicken” by claiming 
infringement of the mark “Eat More Kale.” The context of this threat of legal action 
attempts to extend the rights of the Chick-fil-A trademark to essentially “Eat More” which 
is too descriptive and broad of a term to deserve trademark protection. 
 16.  Grinvald, supra note 7, at 664. 
 17.  Grinvald, supra note 7, at 665–66. 
 18.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1064 (2012). 
 19.  Emily Greenhouse, Dumb Starbucks and the Art of the Hoax, NEW YORKER, 
Feb. 15, 2014, http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/elements/2014/02/dumb-starbucks-
and-the-art-of-the-hoax.html. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. 3:14-cv-02361-RS, 
2014 WL6655844 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014) (Seeborg, J.) (where a district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of a video game publisher that had used a military patch design 
in a military combat-themed video game, citing earlier precedent that video games qualify 
as expressive works entitled to the protections of the First Amendment); Lyons P’ship v. 
Giannolous, 179 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir. 1999) (where the satirical or parodic use of a 
trademark will likely influence a court’s decision in determining customer confusion of the 
DISPOTO_FINAL EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/7/2016  3:42 PM 
[VOL. 16:  457, 2015]  Protecting Small Businesses 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 461 
similar trademarks that associate with a well-known trademark, the 
distinctiveness22 and value of the well-known trademark could and likely 
will decline.23 
Starbucks was surprised by the individual behind Dumb Starbucks and 
initially did not bring suit because they were unsure how to handle the 
situation.24 One could speculate that a reason Starbucks did not sue right 
away was to preserve its reputation, which might start to decline if they 
are demonstrably a bully in their market, especially given the recent 
events of Starbucks and the Exit 6 Brewery described at the beginning of 
this comment. Because the Starbucks trademark has a great deal of value 
associated with the company, it is likely that a lawsuit will be brought 
against the Dumb Starbucks creator, otherwise Starbucks would seem to 
condone such actions, potentially spawning other impersonators. Since 
the Lanham Act protects trademarks that are not generic or abandoned, 
most companies would bring a lawsuit under the Act in order to protect 
their trademark and show they do not condone impersonation.25 The 
Lanham Act incentivizes trademark holders to be proactive in their 
enforcement of trademarks in order to maintain their trademark’s  
distinctiveness and goodwill.26  However, sometimes that legislative incentive 
is too strong. In order to minimize large trademark holders’ overactive 
 
use, however, the strength of the mark might make it easier for an audience to understand 
the use is satirical or a parody). 
 22.  See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (1976) 
(demonstrating the spectrum of “distinctiveness,” or essentially what makes the mark itself 
different than other producers of goods, as a tiered system of generic, descriptive, 
suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful). 
 23. Throughout this paper, policing efforts of trademark holders will be discussed 
and should be understood to be a balancing approach. On the one hand, a trademark holder 
must actively police their trademark so that it will not become generic, in order to maintain 
the protections afforded trademarks under the Lanham Act. On the other hand is the 
overactive policing of trademark bullies who use similar trademark efforts to expand their 
trademark protections beyond what should be allowed for the trademark. See Deven R. 
Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1789, 1793–97 (2007) (stating that the 15 U.S.C. § 1127 of the Lanham Act requires self-
policing of marks in order to maintain their source-identifying purpose, otherwise the mark 
may be deemed to be abandoned, in which case all protections of trademark law would 
disappear). 
 24.  Jolie Lee, Starbucks responds to Dumb Starbucks in L.A., USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 
2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2014/02/10/dumb-starbucks-parody- 
free-coffee/5357597/. 
 25.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1127 (2012). 
 26.  See id. 
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policing against their respective targets, Congress must add provisions to 
the current trademark statute to dissuade markholders from overly 
policing their trademarks.27 
This Comment will first seek to understand the problem of overactive 
trademark policing by starting with a brief introduction to trademarks, 
trademark bullying, and the modern methods that companies use against 
trademark bullying. Second, this Comment will make a comparative analysis 
of the United States federal and state statutory provisions, proposed legislation 
from Minnesota, a trademark reform theory from William McGeveran, 
and current trademark statutory provisions in the United Kingdom.28 After 
analyzing the most pertinent provisions of the active and proposed domestic 
trademark laws and the trademark law from the foreign jurisdiction, this 
comment will seek to solve the problem of trademark holders’ overactive 
policing efforts by proposing a new domestic statute that would better 
protect targets of their bullying. 
II.  TRADEMARKS AND TRADEMARK BULLYING 
In the United States, a trademark is defined by the Lanham Act as a 
“word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . to 
identify and distinguish [a company’s] goods, including a unique product, 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of 
the goods, even if that source is unknown.”29 Trademarks act as a source 
identifier,30 which helps consumers identify a specific product, or the 
quality and reputation of a product or manufacturer.31 
Trademarks are very specific and are capable of protecting the myriad 
of different ways that a producer can distinguish its product to the 
consuming public. One product may be trademarked in several different 
ways as long as the trademark holder uses the mark as a way to identify 
 
 27.  Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Extortion: The End of Trademark Law, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 585, 587 (2008). 
 28.  The United Kingdom was specifically chosen because it has a statute that is 
relevant to deter individuals from sending groundless cease-and-desist letters, which is a 
major problem associated with trademark bullying and an act that the proposed amendment 
will attempt to eliminate as a method of trademark bullying. 
 29.  15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
 30.  Martin J. Rome, The Trouble With Trademarks: Product Namers Beware, ASHA, 
http://www.asha.org/Publications/leader/2011/110118/The-Trouble-With-Trademarks—
Product-Namers-Beware.htm. 
 31.  See DEP’T OF CONGRESS, REPORT TO CONGRESS: TRADEMARK LITIGATION TACTICS 
AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES TO PROTECT TRADEMARKS AND PREVENT COUNTERFEITING 
4, (Apr. 2011), http://www.uspto.gov/ip/TMLitigationReport_final_2011April27.pdf [hereinafter 
“REPORT TO CONGRESS”]; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 163–
64 (1995). 
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the product’s source or origin.32 Consider the word “Red Bull,” as a 
trademark for energy drinks, where the name of the product can be 
trademarked, or the image of two red bulls charging at each other before 
a circle backdrop can be trademarked as a logo for the product. There is 
even the potential that the silver, blue, red, and yellow color scheme can 
become trademarked if the consumers comes to associate those colors 
directly to the Red Bull Product. The name, logo, and color association 
can all demonstrate to the consumer what the Red Bull product is after 
their first experience with it, and any time that consumer sees the same 
name, logo, or color association, the consumer will remember their previous 
experience.33 
The Lanham Act, state statutes, and common law protect  both 
trademarks registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) and—in an attempt to prevent confusion—trademarks that are 
not so registered.34 Once a trademark becomes inarguably “famous,” its 
trademark holder(s) can sue infringers for diluting the distinctiveness of 
that trademark without having to prove confusion, mistake or deception, 
which is normally needed to prove trademark infringement of a registered 
or unregistered mark.35 These dilution actions are available to protect 
trademark holders against alleged infringers who tarnish or blur the 
mark’s image, which could inflict irreparable damage upon the goodwill 
associated with the trademark.36 In a general infringement action, the 
 
 32.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Overview of Trademark Law, https://cyber.law.harvard. 
edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm. 
 33.  Where the original intention was for the purpose of determining a quality 
product, the same reason exists today to determine if the product has a reliable quality and 
whether the product was adequate for the needs of the consumer.  See Chapter 2. The 
History and Development of Trademark Law, Section 1: The History of Trademark Law, 
Dec. 25, 1999, at 1, available at http://www.iip.or.jp/translation/ono/ch2.pdf. 
 34.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). Since not all trademarks are held by registered 
markholders, third parties may not know the scope of their trademark rights until a lawsuit 
is filed. This creates an incentive for markholders to send cease-and-desist letters to 
anyone that uses identical or similar marks, regardless of whether the goods or services 
are related, and regardless of whether the parties are in direct competition. This perpetrates 
a pro-litigation attitude. See also REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31 (citing Esquire, Inc. 
v. Esquire Slipper Mfg. Co., Inc., 243 F.2d 540, 545 (1st Cir. 1957), where an owner’s 
zealous enforcement of its trademark may not have been justified by the intrinsic strength 
of the trademark, but rather was borne by the owner’s enthusiasm and not an attempt to 
unjustly defend and overly extend the rights in the trademark Esquire). 
 35.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), amended by Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109–312; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a), 1125(a). 
 36.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14247(a) (West 2008). 
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court may award damages or costs of the action; however, a court will 
only grant injunctive relief if a lawsuit is brought as a claim for trademark 
dilution.37 
Failing to actively use, or “reasonably” enforce or police,38 a trademark can 
lead to an abandoned or generic trademark.39 An abandoned or generic 
trademark will lose its intrinsic value and distinct identification by the 
public and can possibly lose value from a loss of reputation and decline in 
sales.40 Conversely, a properly maintained and policed trademark can 
increase a company’s value.41 This can occur by the creation of reduced 
transaction costs or consumer search costs in the market, which will save 
a trademark holder money in advertising costs to repeat purchasers and 
could make the product more recognizable and desirable to the public.42 
One of the most widely recognized trademarks is Apple, a technology 
company that designs, develops, and sells technological devices.43 In 
2013, Interbrand ranked Apple at the top of its list of the most well-known 
and valued global brands.44 Interbrand valued the Apple brand at $98.45 
The commercial value of a company can be based on many different 
things, including trademarks, goodwill, reputation, and the overall brand 
of a company.46 In 2009, Apple was estimated to have a “Brand Value” 
around $15 billion.47 The discrepancy in value between reputation and 
assets comes from the company’s near-instantaneous public recognition 
and its well-established connection with high-quality products.48 Apple’s 
exemplary value comes from the company name, marketability, and quality 
associated with the company, thus demonstrating the necessity to take great 
measures to protect trademarks associated with a company brand and 
 
 37.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1)(b), 1116(a), 1125(b), (c)(2). 
 38.  “Reasonable” enforcement is necessary in order to actively maintain protection over 
a valid trademark, but what is considered reasonable is uncertain and only determined on 
a case-by-case basis. See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367–
68 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 39.  See generally Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (1959). 
 40.  See Michael S. Mireles, The Nuclear Option: Aesthetic Functionality to Curb 
Overreaching Trademark Claims, 13 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 281, 282–
83 (2013); See Port, supra note 27, at 586–88. 
 41.  See Port, supra note 27, at 592. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  See Best Global Brands 2013, INTERBRAND, http://www.interbrand.com/en/ 
best-global-brands/2013/Apple. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id.; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 1. 
 46.  See Paul Hague, Measuring Brand Value – How Much Are Brands Worth?, 
B2B INTERNATIONAL, https://www.b2binternational.com/publications/value-of-brands/; 
see also REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 1. 
 47.  Hague, supra note 46.  
 48.  Id. 
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reputation. However, if a company such as Apple overreaches in taking 
protective measures, it may be accused of trademark bullying. 
The USPTO defines “trademark bullying” as the practice of a trademark 
holder using litigation tactics to harass and intimidate other businesses in 
an attempt to extend their trademark rights beyond the interpretation of 
what the law would reasonably allow.49 The litigation tactic most commonly 
used by trademark bullies is to send cease-and-desist letters to alleged 
infringers to put the “trademark target” on notice that they are infringing 
the sender’s trademark.50 There are some circumstances where sending 
a cease-and-desist letter to an alleged infringer does not amount to trademark 
bullying. However, there are also instances where the utilization of a 
cease-and-desist letter is necessarily trademark bullying, because it is so 
unlikely that the target of such a letter is attempting to copy a specific 
trademark or to trick consumers as to the source of the mark.51 In such 
instances, the trademark holders’ motive in sending cease-and-desist 
letters is to intimidate the trademark target.52 Trademark bullies use this 
method of intimidation to coerce the trademark target to cease use of the 
trademark altogether.53 This tactic is usually successful in pressuring 
alleged infringers to cease using the mark, settle with the “bullying” 
company, and obtain a license to use the trademark; but most importantly, 
it allows the trademark bullies to improperly extend the protection of their 
trademark in the market.54 
One of Chick-fil-A’s trademark disputes is illustrative of the trademark 
bullying process. Recently, Chick-fil-A attempted to broaden the trademark 
 
 49.  Trademark Bullying can additionally occur through confusion as to sponsorship or 
affiliation as well as dilution of the distinctive trademark; however, this paper will focus 
more directly on the passing-off or extension of legal rights claims. Request for Comments: 
Trademark Litigation Tactics, USPTO, at n.1, http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/litigation_study. 
jsp#_ftnref1; William Mitchell College of Law, Trademark Bullying, http://web.wmitchell.edu/ 
intellectual-property/trademark-bullying/. 
 50.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 9–10. 
 51.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628, 648–49. 
 52.  REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 9–10; see also Grinvald, supra note 7, 
at 628. 
 53.  REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 9–10 
 54.  Id. at 9–10, 13–14 (describing how trademark holders in a market might use 
intimidation tactics to broaden the rights of their trademark and eliminate individuals with 
similar trademarks in the same market so that the trademark holder can create a larger market 
for their own trademark). 
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rights granted in its “Eat Mor Chikin” trademark.55 Chick-fil-A got into a 
dispute with a Vermont folk artist named Bo Muller-Moore, who created 
“Eat More Kale” shirts to garner support for the surrounding kale farming 
community.56 When Moore tried to register his “Eat More Kale” trademark, 
Chick-fil-A issued a cease-and-desist letter for the infringement of its “Eat 
Mor Chikin” trademark. Moore decided to enlist legal aid rather than 
settle with Chick-fil-A, which led Chick-fil-A to file suit.57 While this is 
an instance where Chick-fil-A has a valid trademark in “Eat Mor Chikin,” 
this legal action demonstrates Chick-fil-A’s efforts to overextend it famous 
slogan beyond what should be legally protected.58 
First, the use of the slogan “Eat More” in association with a restaurant 
chain is only a descriptive or generic phrase, since it denotes the 
advertisement of some edible product in connection with the company’s 
goods.59 Chick-fil-A purposely misspelled the slogan and used a stylistic, 
graffiti-esque font to create a more distinctive trademark.60  “Eat More” is 
merely a descriptive phrase that should be usable by more than one 
individual. A court should not grant the rights to only one party, especially 
in connection with a food service. 
Second, Chick-fil-A used the “Eat Mor Chikin” slogan with its “cow 
campaign,” which consists of cows protesting against customers eating 
burgers.61 The efforts of the campaign are to demonstrate cows and their 
mischievous activity to persuade the customer to not eat beef, but chicken. 
This can help to create a distinctive meaning of the phrase and has the 
 
 55.  “Eat Mor Chikin” is a live trademark for the Chick-fil-A Corporation, which 
has protection in this mark for the use of costumed cattle in association with restaurant 
services and clothing products. EAT MOR CHIKIN, Registration Nos. 76192789, 
76184298, 75342586, 75340161, 75031044. 
 56.  Carapezza, supra note 15. 
 57.  Mason, supra note 15. 
 58.  If there might seem to be a conflict between aggressive policing and trademark 
bullying, it is because one exists. There is a very fine line between what can be considered 
aggressive policing and trademark bullying, sometimes so fine that it might be hard to 
distinguish whether it is a problem or not. This is where the current trademark regime is 
flawed and where there needs to be an increase in protection in order to adequately protect 
a trademark holders’ rights. Id. 
 59.  See Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 793–95, 797 
(5th Cir. 1983) (describing that trademarks require secondary meaning to warrant 
protection, and allowing others descriptive fair use, especially if the protection would 
substantially limit the ability to adequately compete in the market). 
 60.  The “cow campaign” is one of Chick-fil-A’s advertising campaigns used to 
promote its products. The cows partake in human-like acts in an attempt to persuade 
customers to eat chicken instead of beef. The cows paint billboards and hold signs to 
protest outside Chick-fil-A restaurants. Additionally, the campaign is used as decor for the 
restaurant. See The Cow Campaign: A Brief History, CHICK-FIL-A (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www. 
chick-fil-a.com/Cows/Campaign-History. 
 61.  See id. 
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potential to create a connection with Chick-fil-A and the mischievous 
cows.  This would make one believe the phrase “Eat Mor Chikin” is a 
more specific, more distinctive, and more recognizable trademark than 
competing trademarks.62 The cow campaign in conjunction with the phrase 
“Eat Mor Chikin” makes the brand more recognizable to the customer, 
and makes the specific phrase “Eat Mor” more distinctive. Since the 
connection of “Eat Mor” is used with the cow campaign, this is the phrase 
that should be protected. 
Third, the context of the situation shows that there was no attempt to 
dilute Chick-Fil-A’s trademark. Moore lives in Montpelier, Vermont, 
which is a simple farming community over 100 miles away from any 
Chick-fil-A location. Furthermore, Moore’s use of the “Eat More Kale” 
brand in plain bold black writing is not an interference or an attempt to 
pass-off his mark as being somehow associated with Chick-fil-A.63 
These two marks are only similar in that they share the “Eat More” 
phrase, but that distinction is only apparent when spoken, since Chick-Fil-
A purposely misspells the word “more.” Beyond that, there is no 
connection and no reason to believe that Moore intended to confuse his 
mark with Chick-fil-A in order to gain from Chick-fil-A’s goodwill. 
Although Chick-fil-A must remain vigilant to protect its “Eat Mor” 
mark, this is a perfect example of a company trying to maintain overly 
broad rights through overactive policing litigation tactics.64 The phrase 
“Eat More” is far too generic to be controlled by one trademark holder. 
While the specific stylized wording of the mark, its association with the 
cow campaign, or its association with fast food may be unique, for a court 
to hold that Chick-fil-A is the sole owner of the phrase “Eat More” would 
be too broad and a hindrance to competition in the marketplace.65 The case 
 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Mason, supra note 15. 
 64.  See Wilson Ring, Eat more kale: A David vs. Goliath fight with Chick-fil-A?, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 28, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Latest-News-
Wires/2011/1128/Eat-more-kale-A-David-vs.-Golaith-fight-with-Chick-fil-A. 
 65.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1064; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 8 (articulation 
of factors for likelihood of confusion differs between different circuits, however, they 
range between: (1) similarity of the marks, (2) the similarity or relationship of the respective 
goods and/or services, (3) the strength (inherent and marketplace) of the asserted mark, 
(4) the commonality of trade channels and advertising methods, (5) the sophistication of 
purchasers, (6) whether the accused mark was adopted in bad faith, and (7) the existence 
of actual confusion). 
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was resolved in Moore’s favor when the USPTO granted the application 
for the trademark “Eat More Kale.”66 
Not all individuals standing in Moore’s shoes would stand up to a large 
trademark holder to protect their product.67 The threat of prolonged 
litigation not only may lead to alleged infringers prematurely settling with 
the threatening party, it could lead to them giving up entirely. For instance, 
a USPTO Trademark Litigation Study found that several individuals 
threatened with the process of litigation withdrew their own registration 
for trademarks altogether, without settling, because the possibility of 
litigation was too expensive to be a viable option for a small businesses 
or individual trademark holders.68 
Threatening litigation is not an uncommon tactic for multiple reasons.69 
First, enforcing trademark rights, even if the claim is weak, is an effective 
strategy with relatively few downsides.70 Second, aggressive trademark 
enforcement is often effective in settling disputes without the claims ever 
rising to the level of litigation.71 Third, cases that do go to court have 
limited case law upon which to rely.72 This could result in excessive fees 
when a party would have to craft an original argument for trial, potentially 
costing an alleged infringer, which is usually a small business, a substantial 
amount of in attorney’s fees.73 Small businesses may not have sufficient 
support from human resources, may not be able to dedicate the time to 
prepare for such a lawsuit, or just may not have the financial ability to 
 
 66.  Christina Park, Chik-fil-A Fails to Stop ‘Eat More Kale’ Trademark, FORBES, 
Dec. 15, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/christinapark/2014/12/15/chick-fil-a-fails-to-
stop-eat-more-kale-trademark/2/; Wilson Ring, Man celebrates his new ‘eat more kale’ 
trademark, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 12, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/9a6fc4cd32e 
649a39c5c409cf15abd4e/apnewsbreak-artist-wins-eat-more-kale-trademark; Rudner & 
Paleudis, LLC, Corporate Trademark Bullying: Smaller Businesses Challenge Larger 
Corporations in Trademark Disputes, Jan. 7, 2015), http://www.newyorkbusinesslitigation 
lawyer-blog.com/2015/01/corporate-trademark-bullying-smaller-businesses-challenge-larger-
corporations-trademark-disputes.html. 
 67.  Mason, supra note 15; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 18–19. 
 68.  Conduct amounting to intimidation of targets of trademark holders includes, but 
is not limited to, subjecting the alleged infringer to tremendous attorney’s fees, writing 
complex and intricate legal documents that require professionals to decipher them, providing 
short response times to cease-and-desist letters, and requiring the trademark user to cease 
all use of the mark or be sued. Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628–29, 646–47; REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 18–19. 
 69.  See Port, supra note 27, at 661–62. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 18–19. 
 72.  See Already, LLC. v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721 (2013) [hereinafter Already]; 
Grinvald, supra note 7, at 657–58; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 15 (stating that 
approximately 1.5% of cases arrive in court, meaning that many cases are dealt with at pre-
litigation stages). 
 73.  Port, supra note 27, at 631–32; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 15, 18. 
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defend a suit.74  Even if a small business is capable of securing free or low 
cost legal assistance, the time devoted to the lawsuit would take away 
from the operation of the business, which could bury a company in debt.75 
These threatened legal actions burden the targeted company rather than 
the trademark holders that send out the cease-and-desist letters.76 The 
targeted company is in a precarious situation in deciding which action to 
take.77 They can choose to wait and see if the threatening party will take 
legal action against them, while continuing to potentially infringe the 
trademark. Otherwise, the targeted company may seek a declaratory 
judgment, which could state that its trademark does not infringe upon the 
other party’s mark, thereby precluding further legal action against it.78 The 
threatening party suffers no consequences from sending such letters. Since 
they are often viewed as aggressive policing tactics, no sanctions are 
imposed and the threatening party can decide whether or not to pursue 
legal action.79 Small businesses are particularly influenced by the potential 
threat of litigation, which in turn is externalized as a cost to the consumer 
and the economy.80 
By extrapolating the theory of famous economist Adam Smith, it seems 
that this externalized cost in trademark bullying creates a barrier to entry, 
which in turn limits the choices available to consumers.81 It does so by 
imposing higher costs in the market place, thereby increasing the initial 
amount of capital investment needed for new market entrants and 
ultimately limiting the amount of entrants who are capable of success in 
the market.82  Cease-and-desist letters specifically impose high costs on 
businesses, not just in legal fees, but also in time diverted from the 
 
 74.  Port, supra note 27, at 654–56. 
 75.  Id. at 655–56. 
 76.  Grinvald, supra note 7, at 661–63. 
 77.  See id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  See id.; REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 20. 
 80.  REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 20; Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628–29. 
 81.  Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628–29. “Invisible hand” reflects the ideology that 
the market is guided by the competition of the free market, effectively creating the 
products that the consumer wants to have. The market expands based on the idea that more 
entrants will create products based on the consumer’s demand, which will effectively 
create higher quality products and lower prices based on the producer’s competition for 
the consumer. Adam Smith, Biography, in LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, THE 
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (2008) [hereinafter “Invisible Hand”], http://www. 
econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Smith.html. 
 82.  See Port, supra note 27, at 589. 
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business.83 This harms the consumer, because the fewer companies that 
are in the market, the fewer products that are available to the public, and 
those available will tend to be of a lower quality.84 Competition between 
companies improves the quality of products and lowers prices, because 
competitors produce better and cheaper goods or services in order to win 
consumers.85 
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court seemed to agree that there 
were higher costs to a business because of infringement claims and it 
warned in Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc. that litigation produces limitations 
in the marketplace and that other costs could arise from the threat of 
trademark infringement: 
[C]harges of trademark infringement can be disruptive to the good business 
relations between the manufacturer alleged to have been an infringer and its 
distributors, retailers, and investors. The mere pendency of litigation can mean 
that other actors in the marketplace may be reluctant to have future dealings with 
the alleged infringer.86 
In other words, the threat of trademark litigation is effecting the 
marketplace. 
Circumstantial evidence supports the Supreme Court’s statement 
concerning litigation’s threatening effect on the marketplace.87 Within 
the past decade, the injunctions, attorney’s fees, and damages ordered by 
courts in trademark actions have dropped by approximately ninety-nine 
percent; however, the number of trademark infringement claims filed is 
ascending on a yearly basis.88 This demonstrates that while more cases are 
being filed, a substantial number of them are being resolved in the pre-
litigation stages. 
Professors Kenneth Port and Leah Chan Grinvald believe the result of 
bringing trademark infringement cases is at least in part due to companies’ 
improper desire to expand their market share and thereby impose greater 
 
 83.  See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 20 n.54. 
 84.  See Nicole Manuel, How Does a Monopoly Affect Business and Consumers?, 
HOUSTON CHRON., http://smallbusiness.chron.com/monopoly-affect-business-consumers-
70033.html. 
 85.  See discussion of the “Invisible Hand”, supra note 81. 
 86.  Already, supra note 72, at 733–34. 
 87.  Threatening a small business not only imposes the costs of trademark infringement 
but, based on Justice Kennedy’s words, could harm potential future profits for a business 
as well. With a small business where the potential to improve can be astronomical, the 
harm that can be incurred cannot reasonably be valued. For those trademark bullies that 
bring actions against small companies, there is potential for abuse that may bring a trademark 
infringement action purposefully to stall a small businesses development. See Port, supra 
note 27, at 622–23, 633. 
 88. Already, supra note 72, at 733–34 (2013); see also Grinvald, supra note 7. 
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costs onto the market.89 The greater market costs are caused by greater 
legal costs, which companies must calculate as additional investment and 
may become a barrier to entry for new market entrants.90  With a higher 
likelihood that they will have to face legal action to stay in the market, 
similar to the Chick-fil-A/Eat More Kale case above, potential entrants might 
stay away from the market altogether.91 By dissuading potential entrants, 
the marketplace is affected, because the market’s efficiency will suffer 
due to less competition and less need to innovate, the market’s suppliers 
will have fewer individuals to sell to, and the consumer will have fewer 
choices, thus diminishing the effectiveness of the trademark laws meant 
to protect those individuals.92 
After examining how litigious tactics can be used in an attempt to 
dissuade new entrants into the market, and how the tactics allow current 
trademark holders to broaden their trademark rights, it becomes apparent 
how trademark holders can abuse the legal system. It also demonstrates 
the need to protect alleged infringers from those who use litigation tactics 
to overstep the boundaries of their trademark protection and force others 
out of the market. The next several sections of this comment will examine 
current laws that may limit or discourage trademark bullying in United 
States, as well as in the United Kingdom. 
III.  U.S. TRADEMARK LAW AND THE PROBLEM OF                               
TRADEMARK BULLYING 
The first trademark law to consider is the United States’ Lanham Act.93 
The Lanham Act is a federal law that protects both registered marks, under 
 
 89.  See Port, supra note 27, at 622, 633–34 (stating that trademark extortion is one 
plausible explanation for the rise in the number of trademark infringement cases with a 
decline in trademark infringement trials, and believing that this rise can effectually 
circumvent antitrust laws); see also Grinvald, supra note 7, at 640–41 (stating that trademark 
laws force the owners to bring legal tactics in order to police their trademarks, which has 
the potential to lead to abuse). 
 90.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 603–04. 
 91.  By “threatening” new market participants, a trademark holder can increase their 
market share without actually expanding the business, by merging or buying out smaller 
businesses, and can in some circumstances avoid antitrust laws. See Port, supra note 27, 
at 622, 633–34; see also Grinvald, supra note 7, at 650–51; see also supra notes 55–64 
and accompanying text. 
 92.  See Port, supra note 27, at 632–34; see also Grinvald, supra note 7, at 650–51. 
 93.  Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012). 
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section 1114(a) and (b), and unregistered marks under section 1125(a).94 
Civil actions are available under either section for trademarks used in 
connection with goods that are similar enough to another trademark, such 
that it is “likely to cause confusion or cause mistake.”95 Additionally, under 
section 1125(c), trademark protection extends to those marks that are 
“famous” if an infringing party’s use makes the mark less distinctive or 
tarnishes the image associated with the trademark.96 If a mark likely causes 
confusion to the market’s customers, then a trademark holder can bring a 
lawsuit for either damages (lost profits and, for exceptional circumstances, 
treble damages) or an injunction, and on some occasions, parties are awarded 
costs.97 
Most remedies attempt to compensate the plaintiff by awarding 
damages to the trademark holder for any loss of exclusivity of the marks 
and seek to return the trademark holder to the same financial position it 
would have been in had the defendant-infringer never infringed or never 
entered the market.98 For example, the Lanham Act may return to the 
trademark holder the costs incurred from litigation, profits made by a 
trademark infringer, and any costs that resulted from the harm done to the 
trademark holder, such as loss of sales.99 However, while measuring and 
granting damages ex post will remedy the plaintiff in some circumstances, 
 
 94.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a)–(b), 1125(a). Similar provisions are found in several state 
statutes as well. For instance, California has the same provisions and effectually mirrors 
the protections, requirements and defenses that are found within the Lanham Act. The 
policy for the California Business and Professions Code acts similarly to the Lanham Act 
as well by attempting to put an infringed markholder in the same place they were in before 
the infringement occurred. This policy is based on the assumption that no damage will 
occur to the reputation as a result of the infringer or the infringed company bringing a 
lawsuit against the infringer. If there is damage to the reputation of a product or company, 
then a dilution action may be brought but will only allow an injunctive relief. CAL. BUS. 
& PROF. CODE §§ 14245–50. 
 95.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 
 96.  Under a claim of dilution, the only available remedy is an injunction. Id. § 
1125(c). 
 97.  Id. §§ 1116(a), 1117(a)–(b). 
 98.  If damages are distributed for the purpose of compensating an individual for 
harm that has occurred, then to compensate someone that has incurred an injury based on 
confusion would be to compensate that individual assuming that the damages can place 
the individual in the same position where the company would have been had there been 
no damage from confusion. Thus, the damages are restorative and are for the purpose of 
returning them to the same position they were in prior to harm occurring, at least to the 
extent that the damages can adequately compensate them. Id. § 1117; MARTHA CHAMALLAS, 
THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 157 (2010). 
 99.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1116(d)(4), 1117(a). 
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it will not always resolve and remedy disputes, especially those concerning 
new entrants into the marketplace.100 
While the Lanham Act provides for damages after the infringement 
occurs, it is impossible to measure lost profits if a company is bullied out 
of the market before it has a chance to accumulate any profits.101 
Additionally, the target of a trademark holder will not likely be afforded 
the right to an injunction at law because they are not making claims of 
infringement or dilution against the trademark bully.102 Generally, the 
only option for alleged infringers is to seek a declaratory judgment, which 
may be difficult because the target of a trademark holder usually does not 
have the necessary financial resources, personnel, or time to maintain such 
a lawsuit.103 Furthermore, if an alleged infringer attempts to dismiss a 
lawsuit against it, there are limited chances for it to succeed because 
trademark suits contain many questions of fact, which are issues for a jury. 
Ultimately, the likely end result is a settlement that the alleged infringer 
was forced into because they were not able to compete with the costs of 
litigation. 
Some trademark bullies mass send cease-and-desist letters without 
intending to follow up with any formal legal action.104 In such a scenario, 
the alleged infringer has a few options, but none are ideal. First, the 
recipient of such a letter could file a lawsuit in order to secure venue or to 
act preemptively against the trademark holders that sent the letter alleging 
 
 100.  See Port, supra note 27; Paul Graham, Startup = Growth, Sep. 9, 2012, http://www. 
paulgraham.com/growth.html (since startups grow so fast, it can be difficult to pinpoint 
how much a startup would make in the early stages of its life); Jules Maltz, How Fast 
Should You Be Growing?, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/08/ 
24/how-fast-should-you-be-growing/. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  It is unlikely that a smaller business will bring a trademark infringement action 
against a much larger company under a theory of reverse confusion where the large 
company has the personnel and the money to finance extensive litigation. While this has 
happened in this past, it could potentially lead to negative consequences to the small 
business owner, who has the potential to get buried in legal costs, lack resources to manage 
their own business while seeking litigation, or lose association or distinctiveness with their 
mark from heated litigation. See Lanham Act §§ 1114, 1125; see also Grinvald, supra note 7, 
at 654–57. 
 103.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116, 1117; see also Grinvald, supra note 7, at 654–57. 
 104.  This is a very common and effective strategy because there is relatively little 
downside to aggression when trying to police one’s trademark. What is “reasonable” to 
one party is a subjective idea and could be considered over aggressive, or even too lenient, 
to another. See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628, 632–33, 639–40, 644. 
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their trademark is invalid.105 However, this may not be a smart strategic 
move because, if the trademark bully was mass sending cease-and-desist 
letters, it might not know how strong of a trademark infringement case it 
has against the target. Moreover, by proactively bringing a suit against the 
trademark bully, who might not have litigated at all, the alleged infringer 
could potentially be giving notice that it’s using the trademark, when it 
otherwise could have just flown under the radar.106 Second, the receiver 
of a letter could file a declaratory action against the trademark bully and 
obtain a court order declaring that they are not infringing on the 
markholder’s trademark. However, this will likely result in a counterclaim 
for infringement or dilution. Third, the receiver could take no action, 
otherwise known as the “wait-and-see” approach. If the letter was 
meritless, this would be the best option. However, lack of merit is difficult 
to determine beforehand and the letter informs the party of the other’s 
trademark, which, if the alleged infringer continues to utilize the trademark, 
the court might later consider willful infringement.107 Moreover, unlike 
some foreign jurisdictions, United States law does not include a provision 
governing groundless threats.108 Thus, those living in the United States are 
limited in their avenues of action against trademark bullies. 
While there remain options for alleged infringers to pursue, these 
options are only plausible for companies and individuals that have been 
established long enough for their revenues to have steadied and plateaued, 
and thus have sufficient resources to maintain a legal action.109  Furthermore, 
while the Lanham Act is predominately favored by those that could 
maintain a legal action, the protections are still functional to targets of 
trademark bullies, however a difficulty may arise in assessing damages.110 
 
 105.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1064. 
 106.  The current trademark regime could allow this action to happen, because 
someone who acts to aggressively police their own trademark will not incur any penalties. See 
Grinvald, supra note 7, at 628, 632–33, 639–40. 
 107.  Since a cease-and-desist letter has the potential to put an infringer on notice of 
their infringement, it may be assumed that a continuation of a trademark after a letter is 
received is willful infringement. Burger King v. Mason, 855 F.2d 779, 780–781 (1988) 
(finding that the court has a wide range of discretion to confer damages, including an award 
of lost profits, even if there is no actual demonstration of damage). 
 108.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.; Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21 (U.K.); Trade 
Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 129 (Austl.). 
 109.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 653–57. 
 110.  Financial analysts can help determine and predict damages, but they cannot 
provide accurate readings based on pure assumptions. See 15 U.S.C. §1117; see also 
Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Gadsden Motel Co., 804 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(acknowledging that trademark infringement damages must be based on proof of actual 
damages and that some evidence of harm arising from the violation must exist); BRIAN P. 
BRINING, FINANCE & ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 256, 267–68 (2011) (stating that while 
courts will allow damages for new business ventures, much of the calculation for such 
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Since revenues for small businesses have the potential to rapidly expand, 
justice might not be served if a small business cannot accurately assess 
what its revenues would be, what internal damages were incurred, or what 
harm was actually accrued to its small business brand.111 This lack of 
valuation is a problem. 
The problem is the ability of a trademark holder to bully and abuse an 
alleged infringer’s business with the intention of slowing the expansion 
of the target company. Litigation imposed on an alleged infringer in this 
manner could ruin the target of a markholder’s business momentum. 
However, because the trademark bully is usually the one spearheading all 
litigation efforts, the proper remedy would be a dismissal of the action or 
a declaratory judgment in favor of the defendant instead of an award of 
damages.112 
Alternatively, an alleged infringer could initiate the lawsuit against the 
large trademark holder in order to obtain a declaratory judgment, but this 
is rarely the case.113 While different than the wait-and-see approach 
previously discussed, it is not a strategic business tactic, especially if the 
markholder has financial resources at their disposal.114 The markholder 
could draw out a trial and bury the alleged infringer in litigation costs, 
effectually ruining the alleged infringer. 
It may not always be the best idea to initiate litigation, but it is often 
markholders’ chosen tactic to protect their trademark. This is the most 
 
damages is speculative and requires more assumptions than an established business); 
ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS 378 (6th ed. 2005) (lost 
profits of an unestablished business recovery is increasing, but requires that they be 
adequately proved with reasonable certainty); Kenneth M. Kolaski, Measuring Commercial 
Damages via Lost Profits or Loss of Business Value: Are these Measures Redundant or 
Distinguishable?, PACE LAW SCHOOL (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.cisg.law. 
pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kolaski.html. 
 111.  See Graham, supra note 100; Maltz, supra note 100. 
 112.  Port, supra note 27, at 587–89 (demonstrating that litigation is one of the costs 
imposed on the marketplace that makes entrance more difficult). 
 113.  Nathaniel Edwards, I am . . . Other – How Trademark Owners can Avoid Declaratory 
Judgment Actions, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY BLOG OF LEWIS ROCA ROTHGERBER LLP 
(July 7, 2013, 5:46 PM), http://www.lrrlaw.com/ipblog/blog.aspx?entry=762 (explaining 
that this alternative rarely occurs because of the disparity of power between the parties, 
but also because there are ways to avoid creating an “actual controversy” between the 
parties, such as avoiding attaching a draft complaint to cease-and-desist letters, writing 
“soft” cease-and-desist letters, or not threatening proceedings in cease-and-desist letters); 
see Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 725 (2013) (demonstrating that a more 
typical way to defend a company trademark is to cross-complain that the mark is invalid). 
 114.  Port, supra note 27, at 633–34. 
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apparent disadvantage of the Lanham Act.115 Companies actively police 
trademarks because it is necessary to keep them distinctive under the Lanham 
Act.116 Allowing others to use a trademark increases the likelihood that 
the trademark will become generic, which would void protection from the 
Lanham Act.117 Fear of losing protection and reputation creates the 
necessity to actively police trademarks, thus perpetuating the mindset of 
sending cease-and-desist letters to similar trademark users.118 
One such area of trademarks that has particularly active policing is 
product design. Because there are a tremendous amount of knock-off products 
in the market, it is often necessary for product designers to remain 
proactive in prohibiting individuals from copying the exact designs of a 
trademark.119 The following case demonstrates an example of how Nike, 
Inc. acted in accordance with this active policing approach for its Air 
Force 1 trademark. 
In Already, LLC v. Nike Inc., Nike sued under Lanham Act section 1114(a) 
for infringement and section 1125(c) for dilution of Nike’s Air Force 1 
trademark.120 Already, LLC (“Already”) defended its trademark by arguing 
that Nike’s trademark was invalid, and in return, Nike offered a settlement 
as long as Already signed a covenant not to sue.121 The case settled four 
months after Already counterclaimed arguing invalidity of Nike’s trademark, 
but there was no decision reached as to the validity of the Air Force 1 
trademark.122 
While Nike’s actions were ostensibly suspicious, the settlement 
prevented the court from looking into the validity of Nike’s trademark by 
rendering the case moot. Already’s decision to settle allowed Nike to slip 
through the cracks and continue using its mark in association with its 
product and to continue bullying other companies.123 
 
 115.  See Port, supra note 27, at 588; see also Grinvald, supra note 7, at 640. 
 116.  Companies need to actively police so that their trademarks do not become 
generic and get cancelled. 15 U.S.C.  § 1064. 
 117.  See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 97 (2d Cir. 
1989) (holding that because other companies in the industry started using the term 
“Murphy Bed” to describe a general type of bed, the term became generic and lost its 
association with the company). 
 118.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 641–42. 
 119.  See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 208–09 (2000) 
(remanding the case to determine if the product design had secondary meaning after Wal-
Mart contracted with a clothing supplier to intentionally make clothes similar to Samara 
Brothers clothing line). 
 120.  The case discusses trademark dilution under the Lanham Act, which may only 
arise under 1125(c). Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 663 F.3d 89, 91 (2nd Cir. 2011). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See id. By signing a covenant not to sue and rendering the case moot, the court 
did not address the validity of the Nike trademark thereby allowing Nike to continue 
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This action demonstrates one of the problems associated with the 
Lanham Act and current American trademark law: large companies can 
buy their way out of a lawsuit or intimidate their competitors into 
submission.124 Nike’s financial strength was its greatest tool in this case 
and exemplifies that a markholder can hold the threat of litigation over 
others’ heads.125 By buying Already’s option to bring suit, Nike proved 
that trademark bullying could extend beyond the confines of the 
courtroom.126 Additionally, Nike will likely remain protected, because no 
other individuals will likely want to engage in a lawsuit with Nike, one of 
the largest athletic brands in the world.127 
Overall, the Lanham Act presents a problem because it provides a cure 
or “remedy” after an injury has already occurred.128 Thus, an alleged 
infringer is more likely to concede to a settlement than to fight for their 
trademark, because of coercive pressure that is exerted onto the alleged 
infringer from a disparity in financial leverage. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE TRADEMARK THEORIES 
The next two sections will address theoretical acts of law that could 
address some of the concerns derived from the disparity in financial 
leverage between trademark holders and their potential targets. Neither 
 
having all the protections that trademark law allows despite having a response about the 
validity of the trademark. 
 124.  See id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (exemplifying the lack of pre-litigation 
protections available for businesses that are much smaller than the trademark bully. It is 
likely that Already was “forced” into a settlement in order to not incur tremendous 
litigation costs by a corporation that has the finances and legal resources to potentially 
draw out a litigation). 
 125.  See Already, supra note 72, at 724 (stating that utilizing covenants not to sue is 
not beneficial for trademark holders in the long run, but bringing lawsuits against more 
humble competitors is encouraged in light of challenging their portfolios of intellectual 
property). 
 126.  See generally id. 
 127.  This is based on the assumption that most small companies would not want to 
have a legal battle with a financial giant like Nike, who holds the highest value sports 
brand at $12 Billion on the Forbes top 40. The Forbes Fab 40: The World’s Most Valuable 
Sports Brands, FORBES (last visited Mar. 24, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mlm 
45jemm/1-nike/. 
 128.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (demonstrating that the remedies are granted after there 
has been some demonstrative reproduction, counterfeit or copy used in commerce or has 
been used in the packaging or signs intended to be used in commerce. All these occur after 
there has been a use in commerce, except for the one instance of intent to use applications). 
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have been adopted at this point in time, but either one would help to 
dissuade large trademark holders from acting like bullies. 
A.  The Small Business Trademark Protection Act 
The Small Business Trademark Protection Act (“SBTPA”) was proposed 
by the William Mitchell College of Law to Minnesota State legislators,129 and 
was created to give smaller businesses an alternative to litigation.130 
SBTPA requires settlement conferences as a primary method for settling 
disputes between trademark holders.131 Either party to the dispute can 
invoke a settlement conference after receiving a cease-and-desist letter.132 In 
the settlement conferences, an administrative law judge oversees the 
parties’ dispute.133 If proceedings continue after the settlement conference, 
the administrative judge has the authority to make declarative judgments 
on undisputed matters in order to expedite trial proceedings.134 Furthermore, 
the proposed statute imposes a penalty on those who sent cease-and-desist 
letters without participating in a settlement conference.135 This penalty 
attempts to discourage trademark bullies from casually or aimlessly 
 
 129.  The initial written version of the bill was sent to the committee on Jobs and 
Economic Growth. It was brought before the State Senate again in 2013-2014 and was 
redirected to the Committee on Commerce and Consumer Protection Finance and Policy. 
While it has not yet been enacted, the proposed statute is continuing to run its course 
through the legislature. Minnesota is one of few states attempting to limit the ability of 
markholders to bully other alleged infringers. There is no indication that other states have 
attempted or introduced into Senate a bill limiting the ability of markholders to “bully” 
others. Ultimately the proposal died in the committee, however it remains the view of the 
author that this proposal would benefit small business trademark holders if it was to be 
enacted. William Mitchell students craft bill to protect Minnesota’s small-business owners, 
WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INSTITUTE (Apr. 5, 2012), 
http://web.wmitchell.edu/intellectual-property/2012/04/bill-protects-minnesota-small-business-
owners/. 
 130.  Small Business Trademark Protection Act, H.F. No. 2996, 2012 H.R., 87th Sess. 
(Minn. 2012), available at http://wdoc.house.leg.state.mn.us/leg/LS87/HF2996.0.pdf; rev’d by 
H.F. No. 1116, 2014 H.R., 88th Leg. (Minn. 2014), available at https://www.revisor.mn. 
gov/bills/text.php?session=ls88&number=HF1116&session_number=0&session_year=2
013&version=list. 
 131.  The settlement conferences act as a cheaper alternative to litigation by removing 
the necessity of paid counsel, although counsel is permitted. H.F. No. 2996 § 4, subdiv. 1. 
 132.  See id. 
 133.  See id. § 4, subdiv. 7. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  This penalty is similar to those seen in the groundless threat provisions of the 
U.K. and Australian Trade Marks Acts of 1994 and 1995, respectively. Id. § 4, subdiv. 9; 
Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21 (U.K.); Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 129 (Austl.). 
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sending cease-and-desist letters without any intention to materialize 
the threats.136 
In principle, this proposed legislation would place the target of a trademark 
holder in a better position by reducing the costs of initial negotiations 
between the parties and by removing the disparity in bargaining power 
between the parties.137 By removing the costs of litigation, the costs imposed 
on new market entrants are lessened, thus more entrants will be able to 
remain in the market, ultimately benefiting the consumer.138 Due to the 
mandatory settlement conferences, alleged infringers’ concerns about litigation 
costs will decrease and trademark bullies will become less successful in 
their overactive policing efforts.139 This will reduce the coercive effect of 
overactive policing, even though some proactive policing will continue.140 
While many of the provisions dissuade trademark holders from bullying 
others in order to prevent litigation, uncertainties remain in cases where 
the conflict does result in litigation.141 If the parties do not agree to 
anything during the negotiations, then the time and money spent to prepare 
for the settlement conference is wasted, for it is likely that only minimal 
benefit resulted from the discussions, except for possible declaratory non-
 
 136.  See H.F. No. 2996 § 4, subdiv. 9 (this provision dissuades aimless cease-and-
desist letters by imposing a penalty on those parties who do not participate in the 
mandatory settlement conferences because those who aimlessly send cease-and-desist 
letters usually have no attempt to follow up on those letters. When they are forced to follow 
up by making their lawyers show up in settlement conferences it is likely an additional 
expense that those companies are not willing to undertake, especially when the cease-and-
desist letters are very vague and can be used with multiple trademark holders); see also 
Grinvald, supra note 7, at 643 (Grinvald notes a case where Warner Brothers policed Harry 
Potter by sending out cease-and-desist letters to anyone that had registered a website with 
‘harry potter’ in the domain name without assessing the operation of the website). 
 137.  See generally H.F. No. 2996 (allowing parties to negotiate pre-litigation and 
forcing the parties into settlement conferences can potentially put the parties on the same 
level, rather than being intimidated through the force of litigation, and may reduce costs if 
the action never makes it to negotiation). 
 138.  Cf. Port, supra note 27, at 587, 589 (Professor Kenneth Port explains that by 
using litigation tactics to impose costs into the marketplace, barriers are created, and fewer 
entrants will come into the market). 
 139.  In addition to the penalties imposed, if the court finds that the entity is in fact a 
trademark bully, more extreme measures are taken, such as imposing certificates of 
dissolution or revoking certificates of authority for foreign companies. See H.F. No. 2996 
§ 4, subdivs. 1, 2, 10 (b) (1)–(2). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  See generally H.F. No. 2996 (stating nothing about cases that result in litigation). 
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issue matters decided by the mediator.142 The negotiations will lead to 
litigation, which will most likely end with the alleged infringer settling the 
matter.143 A markholder that is willing to hold out during negotiations would 
render SBTPA an insufficient protection against trademark bullying.144 
Still, while it is not perfect, the Small Business Trademark Protection 
Act, if enacted, is a step in the right direction. However, it does not solve 
all of the problems associated with trademark bullying. By adding to the 
Small Business Trademark Protection Act and addressing the potential 
“timeliness problems,”145 this law could significantly improve current 
trademark jurisprudence. 
B.  The Trademark Fair Use Reform Act 
William McGeveran’s Trademark Fair Use Reform Act is an alternative 
proposal to consider.146 According to McGeveran, there are three main 
ways to reform trademark fair use: (1) focusing on the reduction of 
administrative costs, (2) creating clearly stated rules, rather than general 
standards, and (3) adding defenses or exemptions independent from the 
prima facie liability requirements.147 All three changes seek to increase 
competition between companies, which benefits consumers. Currently, 
companies are stifled because the current state of the law imposes great 
barriers in the marketplace.148 
 
 142.  Id. § 4, subd. 7 (orders by an administrative law judge may expedite trial time 
by pinpointing facts that are not at issue between the parties). 
 143.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 654–64. 
 144.  See generally H.F. No. 2996. Since the main purpose of the proposed trademark 
statute is to attempt to resolve disputes amicably, a party may dispute all the terms for the 
purpose of attempting to bring the case to litigation. Subdivisions 6 and 9 describe a 
penalty for being prepared to discuss matters, but they do not discuss whether there needs 
to be attempts to solve any dispute between the parties. Furthermore, subdivision 4 
specifies that the parties should be prepared to participate in “meaningful settlement 
discussions,” but does not actually specify any cost or penalty applicable for failure to do 
so. The statute seems to lack any coercive effects that would make the parties adhere to 
the ostensible purpose of amicable discussion. 
 145.  This term is meant to denote the fact that a party could prolong litigation in such 
a way as to drain all the money out of the small business, making the venture fail. If the 
venture failed, there would be almost no point in continuing to seek trademark rights 
through litigation if the alleged infringers wouldn’t have the potential to use that 
trademark, since the venture was already without money. By granting an additional avenue 
of action, there could be amicable discussion to dissuade this prolonged litigation problem. 
 146.  McGeveran’s theory focuses on the intersection of trademark protection and 
freedom of speech, as exemplified in the Starbucks example found in the introduction to 
this paper. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text; see generally William McGeveran, The 
Trademark Fair Use Reform Act, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2267 (2010). 
 147.  Id. at 2279. 
 148.  See id. at 2282. 
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McGeveran seeks to amend the Lanham Act by adding exclusions for 
dilution and categorical exemptions for both trademark dilution and 
infringement.149 If adopted, a court would only need to determine if the 
conduct or the actions of the alleged infringer were either exempted or 
controlled by a safe harbor provision.150 This would be an effective approach 
because—although not necessarily deterring bullying—it would streamline 
the trademark system for exempted or safe harbored infringement actions.151 
As a result, filed infringement actions would likely decline because legal 
threats would be less imminent, as long as the alleged infringer could prove 
their mark falls into an exemption or safe harbor.152 While these provisions 
would be a vast departure from the current trademark system, it would 
meld well with the underlying policies of the current statutory scheme 
through a reduction of ambiguity and an increase in court efficiency.153 
Although these proposals would help small businesses by reducing 
administrative costs and adding protection, the parties still must go to 
court because both of these rules are dependent on the court reaching a 
solution.154 While the process might be shorter and less costly to small 
business owners, the problem of intimidation and the disparity of leverage 
between the parties still exists.155 The mere threat of litigation could stop 
companies from pursuing business opportunities or pressure them to 
submit to settlement.156 To address this issue, small businesses need a way 
to side-step litigation or obtain a declaratory judgment in an expedited 
proceeding. 
While many of the above proposals have beneficial components, it is 
apparent that none of them are completely effective. However, while there 
is no perfect domestic solution, many of the above proposals could be 
improved by incorporating elements of British trademark law. The United 
Kingdom has passed legislation designed to discourage and eliminate 
trademark bullying that is worth examining. 
  
 
 149.  Id. at 2303–04. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 2304. 
 152.  Id. at 2278–79 
 153.  Id. at 2317–18. 
 154.  Id. at 2303. 
 155.  See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 31, at 1–2. 
 156.  Id. at 18. 
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V.  CURRENT UNITED KINGDOM LAWS PROTECTING AGAINST 
TRADEMARK BULLYING 
The United Kingdom and Australia have stronger trademark rights for 
protecting small businesses than the United States.157 However, because 
both statutes are very similar, this comment will only analyze the United 
Kingdom Trade Marks Act of 1994. 
The Trade Marks Act of 1994 defines a trademark as “any sign capable of 
being represented graphically which is capable of distinguishing goods or 
services of undertaking from those of other undertakings.”158 The law 
does not prevent a property or legal right if the mark is unregistered.159 
Similar to the Lanham Act, the United Kingdom uses a likelihood of 
confusion test in order to protect only those markholders that have 
distinctive marks.160 
Additionally, trademark defenses are similar in the United Kingdom to 
the United States. The Lanham Act’s fair use defense, in which a third 
party may use a descriptive term (even if similarly situated with another’s 
trademark), reads: “party’s individual name in his own business, of the 
name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods 
or services of such party, or their geographic origin.”161 The United 
Kingdom statute similarly states that a third party may use another’s 
trademark without legally infringing on the markholder’s rights if the third 
party’s use would be of “his own name or address, the use of indications 
 
 157.  While Australia has some very subtle differences in the law compared to the 
United Kingdom, Australia’s Trade Marks Act of 1995 has all of the same elements that 
make the Trade Marks Act of 1994 better at protecting small businesses than the United 
States’ Lanham Act. For example, Australia’s Trade Marks Act of 1994 allows for actions 
in response to groundless threats, codifies a common law found in the Trade Marks Act of 
1995 (which has no substantive difference), and grants an explicit right of action to anyone 
who is directly or indirectly harmed financially due to the infringement or groundless 
threat against a markholder. See generally Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26 § 21 (U.K.); Trade 
Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 129(1), (3), (5) (Austl.); Grinvald, supra note 7, at 630, 685–86; 
see Jaybeam Ltd. v Abru Aluminum Ltd., [1975] FSR 334, 340 (Austl.); see also ROBERT 
BURRELL & MICHAEL HANDLER, AUSTRALIAN TRADEMARK LAW 517 (2010). Additionally, 
while section 129 allows for actions against groundless threats, it does not eliminate an 
action once litigation starts, but only allows the party an additional avenue to respond to a 
party once they have been threatened with litigation. See Advanced Data Integration Pty 
Ltd. v ADI Ltd., (2004) 138 FCR 520, [17], [18] (Austl.); see also Montana Tyres Rims & 
Tubes Pty Ltd. v Transport Tyre Sales Pty Ltd. (1998) 155 ALR 489, 509–10 (Austl.). 
 158.  While the Trade Marks Act of 1994 has different wording than the United 
States’ Lanham Act, it effectively creates the same law focusing on source-identification. 
Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 1 (U.K.). 
 159.  Id. at § 1(2). 
 160.  Id. at § 10(2). 
 161.  15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
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concerning the kind, quality, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, or 
other characteristics of the goods or services, and the use of the trademark 
where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or 
service.”162 These two provisions are nearly identical. Furthermore, 
similar remedies are available in the United Kingdom’s  courts where 
the markholder may be granted damages, injunctions, accounts or other 
remedies in respect to the infringement of any property right.163 
One major departure from United States law is the common rule of the 
United Kingdom concerning attorney’s fees.  Fees are shifted to the losing 
party, which differs from the “American rule,” in which statutes or 
contracts are the circumstances required for attorney’s fees under United 
States law.164 The possibility of paying significant attorney’s fees should 
discourage frivolous litigation threats.165 
While the trend in the United States is to promote mandatory settlement 
conferences to encourage resolution before trial, similar pretrial procedures 
are not mandatory in the United Kingdom.166 Parties have the option of 
settling before trial, but the attempts are not compulsory and are less 
effective without a judge present.167 
Specifically in respect to protecting small businesses, the United Kingdom 
has one provision that overshadows the protections granted under the 
Lanham Act. Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 is a provision 
specifically directed at parties sending groundless threats.168 According to 
 
 162.  Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 11(2) (Eng.). 
 163.  Id. at § 14(2). 
 164.  See Werner Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37, 45-46 (1984); Walter Olson, Loser Pays, POINT OF LAW 
(May 21, 2004), http://www.pointoflaw.com/loserpays/overview.php. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 
(the Lanham Act requires exceptional circumstances for issuance of attorney’s fees). 
 165.  See Pfennigstorf, supra note 164, at 73. 
 166.  See S.D. CAL. CIV. R. 16.3, 26.1, available at https://www.casd.uscourts.gov/ 
Rules/Lists/Rules/Attachments/1/Local%20Rules.pdf. 
 167.  Ostensibly there are trade-offs with different court systems; the United States 
mandates pre-trial settlement conferences in the hopes of maintaining the policies 
concerning costliness, efficiency and speed, whereas the United Kingdom adopted more 
specific trademark laws. See generally Civil Rules & Practice Directions Part 36, 
JUSTICE, available at https://www.justice.gov.uk/courts/procedure-rules/civil/rules/part36; 
Trade Marks Act, 1994, c.26 § 21 (U.K.). 
 168.  Id. Because groundless threats are the most common tactic used by trademark 
bullies, these types of threat actions will be the focus throughout the analysis of foreign 
law. Id. at § 21(1) (noting that another downside of Section 21 is that it does not cover 
three types of infringement: when the mark is applied to goods or packaging, when applied 
to imported good, and does not apply when the mark is applied to services). 
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L’Oreal (U.K.) Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson, a groundless threat will not 
occur as long as a real issue of fact remains and the declarant has a real 
interest in the outcome.169 Only requiring proof of a real issue of fact and 
a real interest make the barrier of “good faith” easy to overcome.170 
Similar to the occurrence of trademark bullying in the United States, 
cease-and-desist letters are the common way to initiate groundless threat 
actions in the United Kingdom.171 Cease-and-desist letters are not the only 
means of starting a groundless threat action, however, as any type of oral 
or written communication meant to intimidate or make known that 
litigation is a viable avenue of action can be considered a groundless 
threat.172 For example, in Prince Plc. v. Prince Sports Group Inc. the court 
found that a principal letter indicating interest in litigation constituted a 
threat, and that a company could not retrospectively withdraw the threat 
through subsequent letters.173 The provision disallowing withdrawal of 
threats holds companies accountable for their actions and forces potential 
issuers of cease-and-desist letters to think twice before sending them.174 
Under section 21 of the Trade Marks Act of 1994, remedies  are 
available when “a person threatens another party with proceedings of 
infringement of a registered trademark.”175 Anyone who is an “aggrieved 
party” may bring an action.176 An “aggrieved party” is defined in Jaybeam 
Ltd. v. Abru Aluminum Ltd., as a party “likely to be adversely affected in 
a real as opposed to a fanciful or minimal way.”177 The remedies available to 
aggrieved parties that bring actions are limited to declaratory statements that 
the threats are unjustified, injunctions against the continuation of threats, 
and damages equivalent to any loss sustained as a result of the threats.178 
The purpose behind this section of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 is to 
provide relief from actions, whether they are ex ante or ex post.179 By 
 
 169.  L’Oreal (UK) Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson and Another, [2000] F.S.R. 686, 688, 
701. 
 170.  See id. 
 171.  As stated previously, not all cease-and-desist letters are groundless, but sending 
these letters is the most common way to groundlessly threat other parties. 
 172.  See L’Oreal (UK) Ltd. v. Johnson & Johnson and Another, [2000] F.S.R. 686, 
688, 701. 
 173.  Prince Plc. v. Prince Sports Group Inc., [1998] F.S.R. 21, 22. 
 174.  See id. 
 175.  Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(1)(a)–(c) (U.K.). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  PATENTS, TRADE MARKS AND DESIGN RIGHTS: GROUNDLESS THREATS, LAW 
COMM’N NO. 345 p. 18 (2013) (citing Jaybeam Ltd. v. Abru Aluminum Ltd., [1975] F.S.R. 
334, for the definition of aggrieved party), available at http://lawcommission.justice.gov. 
uk/docs/lc346_patents_groundless_threats.pdf. 
 178.  Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(2)(a)-(c) (U.K.). 
 179.  See id. (the problems can be curbed through the use of pre-litigation tactics such 
as punitive measures for groundless threat actions and post litigation through a grant of 
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obtaining a declaratory judgment, a targeted party can take preemptive 
action to protect against trademark bullies, and by obtaining damages a 
targeting party can reimburse a party for any damage incurred due to the 
threat of a trademark infringement action.180 Furthermore, an injunction 
prohibiting the continuance of unjustifiable threats can be used preemptively in 
reaction to an initial cease-and-desist letter and act almost like a 
declaratory action, but can also act as a defense to prevent future actions 
of bullying from markholders.181 
The main advantage of injunctions and declaratory judgments is that the 
targeted party does not have to wait-and-see, but can instead be 
proactive.182 The main concern of litigation is time, because both trial 
preparation and procedure are extremely time-consuming. A targeted 
party, especially if it is a small business, may not have the workforce to 
stay in business and simultaneously prepare for trial. However, the 
sections providing for declaratory actions and injunctions may grant 
parties more strategic tools and potentially help them to receive judgments 
expeditiously to prevent the stagnation of small businesses.183 
The provision on groundless threat actions strongly advocates a “sue-
first, talk-later” attitude, because threatening trademark companies sue 
rather than wait for a declaratory judgment or other action in response to 
 
damages to the prevailing party); Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Intellectual 
Property Office, UK government to improve protection for businesses against groundless 
IP threats, Gov.UK (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-government-
to-improve-protection-for-businesses-against-groundless-ip-threats. 
 180.  Damages could extend to cover loss of sales revenue or losses associated with 
case preparation. Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(2)(a)–(c) (Eng.). 
 181.  Id. at § 21(2)(b). 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  By drafting into the statute declaratory judgments and injunctions from the 
issuance of threats, the courts understand that there is a problem with over policing 
trademark holders. Utilizing the tools available through the drafted statute, small business 
owners can act proactively and bring suit rather than building up a trademark only to be 
forced to rebrand at a later point in time. See id.; Grinvald, supra note 7, at 647 (stating 
that a legal system is set up so that billion dollar companies can prolong a lawsuit through 
appeals, if necessary, to drag out litigation to win the litigation by default when the small 
business can no longer pay to be represented); Evan Raynes, Declaratory Judgment 
Actions in Intellectual Property Cases, SYMBUS THE BLOG, (Mar. 14, 2014), https:// 
symbus.com/blog/?p=483 (stating that there are multiple reason for the initiation of a 
preemptive lawsuit, such as: forum selection, time pressures on early parties, and setting 
the overall tone of the case). 
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cease-and-desist letters.184 If the threatening party sues the targeted party 
first and only then starts negotiations, the targeted party has no power to 
utilize the preemptory provisions.185 Therefore, the threatening party can 
force the targeted party into the courtroom and the targeted party will have 
no recourse but to submit to litigation or to accept an offer if the parties 
negotiate and settle.186 This poses a similar problem to some provisions in 
the Lanham Act.187 Trademark bullies, which are usually large companies 
with multiple trademarks, often attack and threaten alleged infringers who 
have a legal right to use their trademarks, but are intimidated by the 
markholders’ threats.188 Moreover, based on the sheer inequality of power 
between the parties, the smaller alleged infringer will likely submit to the 
settlement offered by the markholder. 
Additionally, this “sue-first, talk-later” approach seems to contrast with 
the main policy consideration of resolving disputes amicably before reaching 
litigation proceedings.189 Where one could initially send a cease-and-desist 
letter in order to notify another of a company’s trademark and start amicable 
discussions to settle or avoid litigation, this process is removed.190 A 
trademark holder will get around the “sue-first, talk-later” approach through 
initiating litigation and will be able to leverage the intimidation that comes 
along with such a threating action.191 Usually, an individual receiving a 
cease-and-desist letter has the choice to bring a lawsuit first, if they choose 
to, and has the advantage of choosing venue. However, by serving the 
 
 184.  To prevent a small business from taking advantage of a preemptive strike 
against the trademark holder, markholders can simply sue first or even simultaneously file 
a suit and issue the cease-and-desist letter. This would prevent the issue of a groundless 
threat action where the small business owner would file first on receiving the letter. One 
issue of concern regarding this would be the need to bring a case or controversy before the 
court, which might be a problem for those trademark holders mass mailing cease-and-
desist letters, but not likely for those with more targeted letters. See Grinvald, supra note 
7, at 686. 
 185.  See Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, §§ 10, 21 (U.K.). 
 186.  See id. 
 187.  See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. 
 188.  See, e.g., Already, supra note 72.   
 189.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 686; Howard Johnson, 13 INT’L BANKING FIN. L. 
54, 54–55 (1994) (Eng.). 
 190.  If we view the purpose of pretrial settlement conferences as resolving disputes 
to avoid costly trials and encourage parties to settle, it can be seen that a sue-first, and talk-
later approach in law effectively removes this encouragement. When an individual sues, 
they come from a place of power and act as a threat, especially if the one suing comes 
from a well-funded company. On the other hand, a weaker individual who brings a suit for 
declaratory suit has more potential to place both parties on equal footing and allow an 
amicable discussion to occur. See Johnson, supra note 189, at 55; Glen Gallins, The 
Settlement Conference, THE LAW CENTRE (Mar. 2008), http://thelawcentre.ca/self_help/ 
small_claims_factsheets/fact_12. 
 191.  See Johnson, supra note 189. 
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alleged infringer, a trademark holder can circumvent the issue of 
another party choosing venue. With this circumvention of amicable 
discussion, a trademark holder can use intimidation and threats to 
change the procedures of these actions to become more heavily based 
on the pre-litigation stage. A major departure such as this potentially 
could change mindsets towards litigation, such as the traditional desire 
to avoid litigation, or drive small companies to sue trademark holders 
early-on to make certain they have a right to use their trademark, rather 
than being hauled into court in a foreign jurisdiction. However, this does 
not seem to create an entirely negative result. Some uncertainty in litigation 
will effectively be removed since trademark holders may establish a new 
norm on dealing with trademark litigation, however it does not necessarily 
follow that the removal of uncertainty is beneficial.192 While this statute 
has effectively eliminated the problem of aimless cease-and-desist letters, 
it has also created a “sue-first, talk–later” mentality.193 
Therefore, as with the domestic proposals previously examined, the 
United Kingdom model is not sufficient to resolve the problem associated 
with trademark bullying on its own. The provision on groundless threat 
actions might be sufficient if more is added to protect small business 
holders and if the problem of the “sue-first, talk-later” approach can be 
removed. The next section will propose legislation that can remove the 
“sue-first, talk-later” approach, but keep the protection from groundless 
threat actions. Thus, it aims to combine the best aspects of all the incomplete 
proposals above, as well as some additional ideas, in order to create a more 
effective statutory model. 
 
 192.  See “No Tears,” 32 INT’L R. INDUS. PROP. COPYRIGHT L. 463, 463–66 (2001) 
(Eng.). See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 658–59 (trademark cases are extremely fact-specific, 
therefore issues that are brought to the court will need to arise to the trial level to be found 
by the fact-finder); Erin Coe, SoCal Gains Traction As Hot Spot For Patent Cases, 
Law360 (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/492220/socal-gains-traction-as-
hot-spot-for-patent-cases. While consistency in procedure might occur that does not 
effectively mean that litigation efforts will become more consistent or that courts will 
handle cases more efficiently. There is potential for more consistent or effective efforts to 
occur if the trademark disputes develop into a program designed around such disputes, 
such as a Patent Pilot Program. The purpose of the program is to set up front timelines that 
are to be adhered to throughout the litigation stages. While litigation provides some 
inconsistency, the patent pilot program has such specified dates to move cases expeditiously 
and proceed towards resolution. 
 193.  See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 686. 
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VII.  PROPOSAL FOR A TRADEMARK BULLYING STATUTE 
The current status of trademark statutes in the United States, as well as 
the United Kingdom, is inadequate to protect of the rights of a small 
business trademark holder. By looking to the various statutes created to 
protect trademark rights and compiling them into a single law, one could 
create a new statute that would adequately protect the interests of a target 
of a trademark bully.194 
Ultimately, the purpose of this proposed statute is to give an alleged- 
infringer the option to seek a mediator before a claim is filed.195 By 
creating an avenue that potentially circumvents litigation, a targeted party 
will likely choose to pursue the alternative rather than let the threatening 
trademark holder intimidate or coerce them into ceasing use of the 
trademark.196 
Attached at the end of this comment is a proposed statute, entitled the 
Prevention of Overreach through Litigation Tactics Act (“POLTA”).197 
This proposed statute is in the form of an American federal act that will 
help protect the target of a trademark bully by eliminating the “sue-first, 
talk-later” problem associated with the United Kingdom trademark act as 
well as creating preemptive measures lacking from the current United 
States law.198 
Under POLTA, either party may opt-in to a pre-filing settlement 
conference199 when a trademark holder alleges infringement of a trademark 
 
 194.  See Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012); Small Business Trademark 
Protection Act, H.F. No. 2996, 2012 H.R., 87th Sess. (Minn. 2012), available at 
http://wdoc.house.leg.state.mn.us/leg/LS87/HF2996.0.pdf; Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, 
§ 21 (U.K.); Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 129 (Austl.). 
 195.  See Appendix: Proposed Legislation, §§ 2, 3, which is attached to the end of 
this Comment. 
 196.  See generally Appendix: Proposed Legislation. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  See note 192, supra.  
 199.  Due to the possibility of abuse and disparity in leverage between parties to 
trademark bullying cases, this comment proposes a mandatory pre-filing settlement 
conference similar to that of bankruptcy actions or child custody disputes. Similar to these 
types of cases, pre-filing is the appropriate measure in instances of trademark bullying 
because the disparity of leverage in cases of trademark bullying is sufficient to force 
companies out of business. Because young companies and start-ups have potential to grow 
at astronomical rates, it is imperative that these companies are not restrained to courtroom 
procedures or forced to pay litigation expenses that could defeat the business. See Raf 
Weverbergh, So how fast must your startup grow? Y Combinator has a growth benchmark 
to determine that, WHITEBOARD, http://www.whiteboardmag.com/startup-grow-y-combinator- 
growth-benchmark/; Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325 (2012); Child Custody Information Sheet—Child Custody Mediation, JUDICIAL 
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, (Jan. 1, 2012), available at http://www. courts.ca.gov/1189.htm. 
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through either oral or written statements.200 If either party opts-in the pre-
file settlement conference becomes mandatory and will commence within 
45 days of the targeted party’s notification to the threatening party that they 
opted-in.201 This provision provides preemptive remedies similar to the 
groundless threat sections contained in both of the Trade Marks Acts.202 
Under the Trade Marks Acts of 1994 and 1995, a threatening party could 
circumvent the preemptive provision by simply forcing the party into 
litigation before threatening action.203 However, under section 3, subdivision 
1 of POLTA, even if a threatening party initiates litigation, the targeted 
party can act by requesting that mediation occur before the litigation may 
proceed.204 By granting a targeted party this option, even after litigation 
proceedings have begun, and by mandating that parties participate in 
mediation before a lawsuit can continue, false or groundless threats should 
reduce and would likely cease altogether.205 If a party brings a groundless 
threat, the case will ultimately end in mediation, where the mediator will 
have the power to bring judgment and award remedies to the targeted 
party.206 The combination of these provisions should be sufficient to 
decrease the number of false threats, because going to mediation and 
splitting costs will grant the target of a trademark holder an opportunity 
to be heard rather than be forced into settlement.207 This effectively 
removes the potential intimidation, coercion, and tremendous leverage 
that markholders have over alleged infringers. 
Another important provision of POLTA imposes punitive measures 
onto the threatening party if the party does not attend a pre-filing 
conference after threatening a party with litigation, or if a threatening 
party sends an unspecific cease-and-desist letter.208 The purpose of this 
provision is to impose punitive measures on those parties that send cease-
and-desist letters without substantiating the reasons for such actions or 
 
 200.  Appendix: Proposed Legislation, §§ 1(1), 2(1). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  See Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(2)(a) (U.K.); see also Trade Marks Act 
1995 (Cth) s 129(2)(a) (Austl.). 
 203.  Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21(2)(a) (U.K.); Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 
129(2)(a) (Austl.). 
 204.  Appendix: Proposed Legislation, § 3(1). 
 205.  See Jeff Rifleman, Mandatory Mediation: Implications and Challenges , 
MEDIATE.COM (Dec. 2005), http://www.mediate.com/mobile/article.cfm?id=1863. 
 206.  See Appendix: Proposed Legislation, § 2(1)–(8). 
 207.  See id. 
 208.  Id. § 2(7). 
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those that send letters purely to intimidate alleged infringers. The 
requirement forces threatening parties to articulate valid reasons for the 
threat or else subject themselves to penalties for attempting to unjustly 
broaden their trademark protection in the marketplace.209 
In certain situations, a party from out of state may be unable to appear 
before the court, whereas the mediator should consider such circumstances 
when deciding whether to impose punitive measures. The timeliness of 
the procedure makes this a potential concern, but a party subjecting 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the state should anticipate such a situation. 
The last important provision of POLTA differs from all of the 
previously mentioned statutes in that it concerns a policy that will allow a 
good faith user to retain profits earned during negotiations.210 Under this 
section, a party that uses a trademark in good faith will not have their 
profits disgorged by the continuous use of the trademark during mediation.211 
Good faith under POLTA requires that the party will not attempt to use 
the mark to be associated with a trademark holder’s goods or services, or 
use a mark to take advantage of the goodwill of a trademark. This provision’s 
policy is to allow a trademark holder’s target to continue normal business 
operations without suffering stagnation caused by the alleged infringing 
action. While this provision may be subject to abuse, it is unlikely, because if 
a mediator finds that the alleged infringer is willfully riding-off the goodwill 
of the trademark holder threatening suit, he or she has the discretion to 
impose punitive damages on the target in the form of treble damages of 
profits.212 
Admittedly, there are disadvantages associated with this proposal. First, 
this proposed statute extends the process before which a trial court could 
affirm the pre-file settlement conference decision.213 If this procedure 
becomes compulsory, then, for anyone who takes advantage of the pre-
filing settlement discussions, the trial process will be extended at least 45 
days before a court with jurisdiction can make a binding judgment. In 
terms of the overall time litigation consumes, this is a negligible amount, 
however it may still be a concern if parties want disputes to be finalized 
as soon as possible. 
 
 209.  This type of punitive measure is becoming a trend in intellectual property law. 
Current patent reform discussions indicate an intent to require patent holding companies 
to pay attorney’s fees to reduce extortion. See Grinvald, supra note 7, at 650–51; see also 
Jessica Meyers, Lawmakers: Patent reform will advance, POLITCO (Mar. 5, 2014, 2:48 
PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/03/patent-reform-104278.html. 
 210.  Appendix: Proposed Legislation, § 2(9)–(10). 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  While the damages are not binding, the mediator can recommend damages and 
punitive measures to the court where they may be enforced at the court’s discretion. Id. 
 213.  Id. § 2(4). 
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Second, if a trademark holder’s target does not have a rightful claim to 
use a trademark but forces a threatening trademark holder to go through 
the procedures of POLTA, the trademark holder may have his trademark 
“appropriated” for several months.214 Because the process is mandatory if 
opted-in to, both parties must complete all pre-file procedures before an 
action is brought to court. While the process is long and “appropriation” is 
possible, it is more likely the mediator would catch cases of blatant  
infringement and recommend appropriate damages and punitive measures to 
courts.215 
Third, because both parties are responsible for their own discovery, the 
disparity of leverage between the parties still exists.216 Since either party 
may choose to spend different amounts of time and money on discovery, 
large company markholders would have an obvious advantage. While this 
continues to produce a disparity between the parties, the one threatening 
trademark infringement would still be required to show a real interest and 
harm incurred from the infringement. If evidence or interest or harm does 
not exist, the leverage disparity will not affect the target of a trademark 
holder. Additionally, because a target of a trademark holder can retain 
profits if use of the trademark is in good faith, alleging trademark holders 
will be incentivized to find a balance between offering sufficient evidence 
to prove infringement and keeping their argument concise so that the 
negotiations are not overly extensive.217 Therefore, while there is potential 
for abuse, it is unlikely and if the actions amount to trademark bullying, 
the mediator would likely become aware of it before a lengthy negotiation 
would occur. 
Fourth, the proposal calls for mediation, which results in removing 
actions from the court system.218 This unique construct could cause 
procedural problems if not supported by the legislature. Mandatory 
mediation is a construct that is generally accepted in instances of violence, 
or a peril that requires urgent need and is regarded as being a denial of 
 
 214.  Hijacking in this instance means that an individual could purposely use a similar 
trademark in order to ride off the trademark of another party. Since the process takes up to 
45 days to meet for a pre-file settlement conference and any time afterwards if the alleged 
infringer appeals, a markholder may have their trademark taken or “hijacked” from them 
during this time period. Id. §§ 2(4), (9). 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. § 2(5). 
 217.  See id. § 2(9)–(10). 
 218.  Id. § 3(1). 
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justice.219 Cases with this type of procedure usually involve family law 
(divorce and custody), collective bargaining contracts, community 
development, and small claims, and are all backed by strong policy.220 
However, public policy also shows that trademark bullying cases are 
likewise better left to mediation than litigation.221 Even during mediation, 
the “alleged infringer” is at a disadvantage since either party may bring in 
all evidence at their own expense. Trademark bullies could potentially 
take advantage of this and produce substantial data against an alleged 
infringer.222 It is likely that this will not substantially affect the proceedings 
because a small business will not have a substantial amount of evidence 
to bring forth, thus making it cost effective on their part. Large trademark 
holders may bring as much evidence in as they desire, however, they will 
need to keep in mind how much the case is worth to them, as well as, how 
much evidence the alleged infringer needs to produce to demonstrate it 
has a rightful use to using a trademark. Mediation in this instance would 
act to dissuade a large company from bringing disputes without merit for 
 
 219.  Bankruptcy, divorce, and custody proceedings are examples where mandatory 
mediation is common, and are instances where strong policy dictates that it is necessary 
for mediation to be mandatory between the parties. See Bankruptcy Abuse and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, supra note 199; Child Custody Information Sheet—Child Custody 
Mediation, supra note 199; Martin Svatos, Mandatory Mediation Strikes Back, MEDIATE.COM 
(Nov. 2013), http://www.mediate.com/articles/SvatosM1.cfm. 
 220.  The policy behind allowing mediation rather than litigation is to encourage 
families to work out issues on their own and independent of the court, or because certain 
issues are only exacerbated through the use of the court system. How Courts Work: In 
What Cases Might Mediation Be Used?, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
public_education/resources/law_related_education_network/how_courts_work/mediatio
n_whenuse.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2015); How Courts Work: What are the Advantages 
to Mediation?, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_ 
related_education_network/how_courts_work/mediation_advantages.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2015). 
 221.  POLTA’s proposed pre-file settlement mediation closely resembles the pre-
filing settlement conferences discussed in family law, collective bargaining contracts, 
community development, and small claims proceedings. This proposal relies on pre-filing 
strategies that weigh the balance of freedom to commercialize and the enormous growth 
potential of small companies, which may be made vulnerable by threats of litigation or 
trademark bullying. The early stage development of start-ups have enormous potential and 
trademark bullying is an easy way to frustrate these businesses and for trademark holders 
to create high barriers to entry in markets. Thus, there is a need to have some front end 
protection for these small businesses. See How Courts Work: What are the Advantages to 
Mediation?, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/publiceducation/resources/law_ 
related_education_network/how_courts_work/mediation_advantages.html (last visited Feb. 
22, 2015). 
 222.  Certain law clinics allow students to provide free legal work for small 
businesses/trademark holders, but the services are limited because of the level of skill 
required for complicated trademark cases. See, e.g., Small Business and Trademark 
Clinics, DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.smu.edu/Academics/Clinical-Program/ 
Small-Business-Trademark-Clinic.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2015). 
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they might spend more in costs than they could extort from a potential 
license, thus making a lack of financial resources no longer an issue. 
Lastly, mediation might not be sufficiently coercive, because it is not 
binding. However, by creating more barriers and obstacles to impede 
those who have fruitless claims, this strategy will prevent trademark bullies 
from sending frivolous letters without any intent to pursue their claims. 
Some might criticize this proposal as merely extending and increasing the 
cost of litigation by paying for several stages before ultimately arriving in 
court. However, the use of settlement conferences before trial promotes 
policies of efficiency and expediency in resolving disputes between parties. 
Mediation and settlement conferences force the idea that alternatives to 
litigation are possible, as well as allow both parties to express their views 
concerning the dispute on a faster timeline than the litigation system. 
While this statute may risk occasional abuses, the benefits far outweigh 
the possibility of abuse. The statutes currently in force are subject to 
greater abuse than POLTA.223 By enacting a cheaper alternative for targets 
of trademark holders, there is a higher likelihood for protection of the 
valid trademarks and business ideas that would otherwise be intimidated 
into submission. The relatively low risk for abuse is outweighed by the 
utilitarian benefit to consumers due to the increase of business ventures 
and alternatives in the marketplace.224 
Overall, POLTA attempts to combine the best provisions of trademark 
protection laws worldwide. It aims to grant preemptive measures and to 
remove the “sue-first, talk-later” approach that circumvents the protections of 
the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act. While there is possibility for 
abuse, the potential benefit greatly outweighs the potential abuse. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, after comparing United States federal and state statutes, 
proposed legislation, and United Kingdom trademark laws regarding 
trademark bullying protection, it is clear that the United States has not 
done enough to deter trademark holders from overreaching and expanding 
their market share through unfair litigation tactics. In fact, the Lanham 
Act ensures that companies will continue to act proactively by sending 
 
 223.  Compare Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2012), with Appendix: Proposed 
Legislation. 
 224.  See Invisible Hand, supra note 81. 
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cease-and-desist letters because there is little recourse for alleged infringers 
for such acts.225 
By adopting the statue recommended in this comment, a new substantive 
right of action will be created that will remove the “sue-first, talk-later” 
approach associated with these statutes, similar to both the Trade Marks 
Act 1994 and the Trade Marks Act 1995.226 By creating a federal action 
for these preemptive measures, trademark holders that send groundless 
cease-and-desist letters will be held accountable.227 
Enacting this law will prevent trademark holders from acting aggressively, 
thereby reducing the false accusations of trademark holders and removing 
the tremendous disparity of leverage between the trademark holders and 
alleged infringers.228  Providing targets of trademark holders an avenue to 
pursue lawsuits will be a significant improvement to the current federal 
statutory scheme, and is necessary so that targets can have their voices 
heard and their business’s protected.   
 
 225.  Port, supra note 27, at 588-89. 
 226.  See Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 21 (U.K.); Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) s 
129 (Austl.). 
 227.  See generally Appendix: Proposed Legislation. 
 228.  See id. 
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VIX.  APPENDIX: PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
A bill for an act relating to trademarks; enacting the Prevention of the 
Overreach Through Litigation Tactics Act; proposing new legislation 
containing provisions for timely mandatory pre-file settlement conferences, 
penalty damages available for nonspecific cease-and-desist letters, post-
litigation procedures for mediation, and broad standing for any parties 
aggrieved by threat actions. 
BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE UNITED STATES. 
Section 1. The Prevention of the Overreach through Litigations Tactic Act 
is created for the protection of small businesses, from trademark bullying 
or intimidation through the use of disparity of leverage of larger 
businesses, through mandatory pre-file settlement procedures. 
Subdivision 1. Trademark bullying. “Trademark bullying” as used in 
all sections means the practice of a trademark holder using litigation 
tactics to harass and intimidate other businesses in an attempt to extend 
their trademark rights beyond the interpretation of what the law would 
reasonably allow. 
Subdivision 2. Trademark dispute. “Trademark dispute” as used in all 
sections means the preliminary action of a trademark holder initiating 
contact with another party alleging infringement of a trademark; including 
initiation through cease-and-desist letters, and oral or written 
communication between the parties. 
Subdivision 3. Groundless threat. “Groundless threat” as used in all 
sections means the intimidation or use of litigation tactics unaccompanied 
by specific articulable instances of infringement of an owned trademark. 
Examples include but are not limited to cease-and-desist letters and 
communication between both parties concerning the cessation of a 
trademark. 
Section 2.  Pre-file Settlement Conference 
Subdivision 1. Initiation. Any party affected by a trademark dispute 
has the option to opt-in to a settlement conference. Upon the request of 
any party to a trademark dispute, the parties shall seek a mediator using 
the procedures provided in this article. Pre-file settlement conferences are 
mandatory before trial is available if either party opts-in. 
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Subdivision 2.  Purpose. A pre-file settlement conference is for the 
primary purpose of assisting both parties to attain a quick resolution to a 
trademark dispute and to provide smaller companies an opportunity to 
have their case pleaded without the threat of significant attorney’s fees. 
Subdivision 3. Request for Preliminary Judgment. After the mediator 
or both parties come to a resolution that the action presented is not a 
groundless threat, either party may request a non-actionable judgment by 
the mediator. The mediator has the authority to state his judgment 
concerning preliminary facts and if the action is appealed to a trial court, 
the court appealing the matter should review the mediator’s suggestion. 
Subdivision 4. Procedures. All parties shall attend or be represented at 
the pre-file settlement conference. Parties attending shall be prepared to 
make reasonable attempts to settle the trademark dispute. A pre-file 
conference must be initiated within 45 days after the request of a pre-file 
settlement conference has been delivered to the other party in the dispute. 
Subdivision 5. Information provided. All parties attending the 
settlement conference shall be prepared to discuss all matters relevant to 
the trademark dispute. In preparation of the pre-file settlement conference, 
both parties may provide all information they deem necessary or helpful 
in proving their case at their own cost. Parties may provide information 
relating but not limited to expert testimony, surveys of consumer 
impressions, industry practice standards, and evidence of trademark use 
in commerce. 
Subdivision 6. Orders. If, following the pre-file settlement conference, 
all parties have not come to an agreement but have agreed on an issue of 
fact or any other issue, the mediator may submit an opinion to the court 
confirming the matters agreed between the parties. If both parties agree, 
the mediator may submit a ruling on the matter confirming a preliminary 
judgment based upon the information presented before him. This 
preliminary ruling will be given deference if the trademark dispute 
continues to trial. 
Subdivision 7. Penalties. Penalties shall be imposed on those that act 
contrary to the purpose of this enactment. Penalties are as follows: 
(a) if the party alleging trademark infringement refuses to 
participate in the settlement conference aforementioned in 
this article; or 
(b)  the party alleging trademark infringement sends a cease-
and-desist letter without substantiating specific instances of 
infringing conduct by the alleging party,  
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 that party is liable for a fine of $1,000 dollars and all costs 
incurred by the other party including loss of revenue or costs 
in preparation for mediation. 
Subdivision 8. Remedies. If both parties are in agreement and the 
mediator issues an opinion that the cease-and-desist letter is a groundless 
threat and an act of trademark bullying, an opinion may be submitted to 
the court confirming and adjudging in favor of the defending party. The 
following remedies shall be available to be chosen by the mediator, who 
has discretion to determine what is proper given the current circumstances, 
to be issued to the targeted party: 
(a)  a declaratory judgment that the threats are unjustifiable; 
(b) an injunction against the continuance of threats; or 
(c) damages sustained from the groundless threat, including court 
costs, attorney’s fees and treble damages, shall be available if the 
threatening party’s actions are found to be willfully and knowingly 
groundless. 
Any appeals of this decision are to be submitted to any district court within 
50 miles of the mediation venue. 
Subdivision 9. Collection. If the mediator issues an opinion and the 
losing party does not submit to the opinion of the mediator, the mediator’s 
opinion shall be brought forth to an appropriate venue where a judgment 
may be issued and proper collective proceedings initiated. 
Subdivision 10. Profits made during negotiations. Any profits 
realized by the alleged infringing business will not be disgorged from the 
business for any profits realized up until an opinion is made by the 
mediator, unless the alleged infringing company acts with unreasonable 
delay in the pre-file settlement conference or is found to be willfully and 
knowingly infringing. The mediator has the authority to issue an opinion 
concerning unreasonable delay or willful and knowing infringement by 
either party. If the party is found to be willfully and knowingly infringing 
the trademark, treble damages may be issued measured by the profits 
realized. 
Subdivision 11. Standing requirement. Any party that is aggrieved by 
the sending of the cease-and-desist letter will have standing to assert the 
mandatory pre-file settlement conference between the parties or to bring 
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countersuit against the trademark holder who sent the cease-and-desist 
letter for purposes of a declaratory statement that demonstrates the legal 
usage of the alleged infringing trademark. 
Subdivision 12. Cost of pre-file settlement conference. The cost of the 
pre-file settlement conference is to be split evenly between both parties, 
unless the mediator or judge orders otherwise. 
Subdivision 13. Cease-and-desist letter requirement. 
(a) All cease-and-desist letters involving a trademark dispute sent 
by an individual in United States must contain the following 
conspicuous statement at the beginning of the cease-and-desist 
letter: 
    “All parties named in this letter may exercise their right to a 
mandatory pre-file settlement conference regarding this trademark 
dispute to a mediator of both parties choosing, with costs to be 
split evenly amongst all parties, unless the mediator judges 
otherwise.” 
Section 3. Litigation initiated. 
Subdivision 1.  If litigation has already initiated and the issue in dispute 
concerns the extension of protection between either party’s trademark, either 
party may request the action to be transferred to a mediator, who may 
judge whether the trademark user with senior priority is being infringed, 
before litigation is resumed. 
Section 4. Effective date. 
Subdivision 1. The effective date of this act is to start 120 days after 
voted in by the United States legislature. 
 
